The sight of passengers leaving a large aircraft through emergency slides can be difficult to imagine. The slides are designed to help people reach the ground quickly, but they are steep and can be intimidating. People may stumble, lose their balance, or hesitate when they see smoke or flames nearby. In a real evacuation, cabin crew must keep passengers moving while also ensuring that people do not stop to collect bags or wait for companions.
Investigators noted that many passengers evacuated with their carry-on baggage. That detail matters because baggage can slow movement, obstruct an exit, or cause injuries to people using the slides. It is one of the reasons safety instructions repeatedly tell passengers to leave all personal belongings behind during an evacuation.
The aircraft’s condition continued to deteriorate after the occupants had left. Approximately nine minutes and 40 seconds after the aircraft came to rest, the center wing tank exploded. A large section of the right wing’s upper skin was released and fell to the ground. The panel struck a firefighter who was responding to the emergency, killing him.
That death is the most painful qualification to the often-repeated statement that everyone survived the EK521 accident. All 282 passengers and all 18 crew members survived the incident, but the emergency response cost the life of a firefighter. It would be inaccurate to describe the event as having no fatalities at all.
The firefighter’s death also demonstrates that an aircraft accident does not end when passengers reach the runway. Firefighters and other emergency personnel must continue working in hazardous conditions, often close to burning fuel, damaged structures, and unstable aircraft components. Their work can involve risks that are not visible to people watching from a safe distance.
The aircraft was eventually destroyed by the fire. The airport was closed for approximately six hours, disrupting operations across the region. Emirates later reported that 23 flights were diverted and that more than 23,000 passengers were affected by cancellations, delays, and schedule changes.
For the passengers who had boarded in India expecting a normal flight, the experience had become something entirely different. They had escaped a burning aircraft, but many were injured, shaken, or separated from their onward travel plans. Their immediate needs included medical attention, communication with family members, accommodation, and help arranging new flights.
The evacuation was a major reason the loss of the aircraft did not become a mass-casualty disaster. But the next question was unavoidable: how could a modern wide-body aircraft, operated by an experienced airline crew, strike the runway during an attempted go-around?
Chapter 3: What the Investigation Discovered About the Failed Go-Around
In the days after the accident, the first photographs and eyewitness accounts could show the scale of the destruction, but they could not explain why the aircraft had struck the runway. Investigators needed to reconstruct the flight second by second.
The UAE’s Air Accident Investigation Sector, operating under the General Civil Aviation Authority, led the investigation. The work involved examining the aircraft wreckage, recovering and analyzing flight recorder data, reviewing cockpit voice recordings, studying weather information, and assessing the actions of the flight crew and airport emergency services. Representatives and technical advisers from the aircraft’s state of manufacture, the engine’s state of manufacture, Boeing, Rolls-Royce, and Emirates also contributed to the investigation process.
This was not simply a matter of determining whether the aircraft had experienced a mechanical failure. Investigators had to understand how the aircraft, its automated systems, the changing weather, the pilots’ decisions, and the procedures interacted during a very short but complicated period.
One of the most important findings concerned the aircraft’s approach and landing flare.
As an aircraft approaches a runway, the pilot gradually adjusts its attitude to reduce the descent rate before touchdown. This phase is called the flare. The aircraft should settle onto the runway within the appropriate touchdown zone. If the landing cannot be completed safely, the crew can abandon the approach and perform a go-around.
On EK521, the aircraft continued floating above the runway longer than expected. The wind conditions changed during the final approach, and the aircraft’s performance was affected by those changes. The final report described a sequence in which the aircraft’s speed and lift characteristics contributed to a prolonged float before the landing gear contacted the runway.
The commander decided to go around because he believed the aircraft would not land within the intended touchdown zone. The decision to abandon a landing was not inherently wrong. A go-around is a recognized safety maneuver, and pilots are trained to initiate one when conditions make a landing unsuitable.
The problem was what happened next.
The commander pushed the takeoff/go-around switch, commonly referred to as the TO/GA switch. Under the expected sequence, the system should have commanded the engines to increase thrust so that the aircraft could climb away from the runway.
But the aircraft had already touched down. Because the landing gear had registered ground contact, the system’s logic inhibited the TO/GA switches. The autothrottle therefore remained in the idle mode rather than changing to the thrust mode required for the climb.
The pilots did not recognize that the expected increase in engine power had not occurred. The thrust levers remained at idle, and the engines did not provide enough thrust to maintain the aircraft’s climb.
This is the central technical explanation behind the accident. The aircraft was not simply unable to fly because its engines had suddenly stopped working. Rather, the attempted go-around did not produce the expected thrust response, and the crew did not identify and correct that condition quickly enough.
The aircraft briefly climbed to about 85 feet. That short climb could have created the impression that the go-around was working. But the aircraft’s energy state was insufficient to sustain flight. As its speed and height decreased, the aircraft began sinking toward the runway.
The commander eventually advanced the thrust levers, but the action came too late to prevent impact. The final report concluded that the aircraft struck the runway approximately 18 seconds after the go-around was initiated.
The sequence highlights an important distinction between issuing a command and confirming that the aircraft has responded to it. Pressing a control does not automatically guarantee that the intended action has taken place. Pilots must monitor the instruments, verify the aircraft’s response, and take corrective action if the expected result does not occur.